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The Schlegelians v. the Langdellians
on Legal Education
Robert W. Gordon†
In great dramas there’s a moment when a character
shows up who makes such an impression that, whatever else
may be going on, you just wait for that character to reappear.
Sir John Falstaff makes his entrance in the second scene of
Henry IV, Part I, and from that point on has the audience
wanting to skip over all the ponderous high statecraft of
kings and nobles so we can all get back to Jack Falstaff. Jack
Schlegel, in my recollection, made his entrance in my second
year at Buffalo in the Fall of 1973. Once you hear that voice,
with its almost-whispered, shockingly original and
penetrating aperçus, followed by the cackling laugh that tells
you that you and he, and anyone else who may be around,
are just having the grandest possible time together, you want
more. A year later Schlegel and I, along with Al Katz and
Janet Lindgren, formed “Section 3,” an experimental section
of the first-year that combined Torts and Contracts, made
Procedure auxiliary to both, and set the class to practical
tasks like drafting pleadings, arguing motions, taking
depositions, negotiating contracts. The enterprise took a
good deal of planning, most of which took place in one
another’s homes, accompanied by many bottles of wine and,

†Professor of Law, Stanford University; Chancellor Kent Professor of Law &
Legal History, Emeritus, Yale University.
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when we were lucky, Joanne playing the piano. Our
students, surprisingly (for law students) open to unorthodox
experiments, indulged us with amazing good humor. I think
this may have been the most intense and exciting intellectual
experience of my professional life; and Schlegel was essential
to it.1
It was in that period that he began the research for his
seminal book on American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science (1995).2 Looking back, I see that he and I were
animated by the same questions, which derived from the
disappointments of our own legal educations, and could be
boiled down to, “given the great ferment of 20th Century
thought, why has so much American legal scholarship been
so unadventurous and uninteresting?” We were motivated to
look at some of the exceptions, the adventurous anomalies—
in my case, socio-legal historians like Willard Hurst, in his,
the Legal Realists—in part to try to explain why their work
was treated as weird and eccentric and failed to catch on.
Schlegel noticed that Legal Realism was conventionally
treated as a school of jurisprudence, a theory about how
courts decided cases, and an amateur and perhaps
perniciously relativistic jurisprudence at that; and that this
treatment bypassed a large body of work the Realists did
trying to make good on their promise to integrate law and
social science, to study the law “in action,” in its “social
context.” In the process he rescued a whole tradition of
empirical work from obscurity and some important scholars,
like Underhill Moore, from undeserved neglect and ridicule.
The enterprise was, he concluded, mostly abandoned for
1. I left Buffalo in 1977, but Schlegel has remained a loyal and devoted
friend, not just to me, but to my entire family. We see each other at conferences,
and correspond when the mood strikes. He has been an acute and generous
reader and editor of my work over the years. When my daughter spent a summer
in Buffalo a few years ago, Jack and Joanne looked out for her. Schlegel also
corresponded regularly with my ex-wife Martha until her death last February;
came to her memorial meeting; and wrote a moving tribute for the occasion.
2. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN REALISM
SCIENCE (1995).

AND
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largely contingent reasons (the Depression killed off research
funding, many of the principals went off to join the New Deal,
others got bored with the inconclusiveness of empirical work,
etc.). The book remains today a landmark, one of the most
impressive works of intellectual history in law or any other
field.
The question we started with (“Why . . . so
uninteresting?) has stayed with him. In the last few weeks
I’ve been reading Schlegel’s output on the history and
present condition of legal education. There is a lot of it—in
addition to the book, some fifty-two essays and reviews in the
HeinOnline
database,
which
include
delicious
improvisational riffs alongside many richly footnoted
articles. Among his many other concerns, Schlegel wants to
explain how C.C. Langdell’s Harvard Law School experiment
of the 1870s and 80s ultimately became the template for legal
education in the entire country, adopted even by schools
preparing students for very different practice jobs than those
of the big-city law firms. There was nothing inevitable about
its triumph. From the start the model ran into resistance,
and had many rivals: the night schools that actually
educated most lawyers until their demise in the Great
Depression and World War II; Columbia’s blending of Law
and Political Science;3 or Ernst Freund’s University of
Chicago,
which
offered
courses
in
Legislation,
Administrative Law, Relation of State to Industry, Labor
and Capital, and Railroad Regulation;4 John Norton
Pomeroy’s Hastings curriculum combining legal theory with
history and political science to supply a theoretical
foundation in the first year, and using the third year for
practical exercises such as trial preparation and drafting
documents;5 Woodrow Wilson’s projected (but never built)
3. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. ET AL., A HISTORY
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 85–89, 95–97, 67–68 (1955).

OF

THE SCHOOL

OF

LAW

OF

4. See Paul Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 467, 491–92 (1994).
5. See THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST
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law school at Princeton, also combining private law with
public law, history, and political science;6 Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld’s fantastically ambitious proposal for a School of
Jurisprudence;7 or John Henry Wigmore’s construction of an
ideal curriculum that would supplement case-method
training with explicit attention to legal history, legislation,
and comparative law.8
What then was the attraction of the Harvard model?
Schlegel borrows some explanations from Robert Stevens’s
classic history of legal education9 and Jerold Auerbach’s of
the legal profession10: the drive to restrict entry to the
profession to graduates of seven years of higher education
was in part a class project to exclude lower orders and a
nativist project to exclude Jews and the foreign-born
generally from the profession. He borrows others from
Magali Sarfatti Larson’s theory of professionalization11 as a
market-control project dependent on “state sanction for
exclusive possession of distinct knowledge based on
university production of certified professionals.”12 The key
move for professionalizers is to identify a field of operation
distinct from anyone else’s and to standardize its content and

CENTURY 103–06 (1978).
6. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Albert Shaw (Nov. 3, 1890), in THE PAPERS
1890-1892, 63 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969).

OF WOODROW WILSON,

7. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law:
Have American Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and
Responsibilities of the Present Day?, 14 HANDBOOK ASS’N AM. L. SCHS. 76 (1914).
8. John H. Wigmore, Nova Methodus
Jurisprudentiae, 30 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1916-1917).

Discendae

Docendaeque

9. ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980s (1987).
10. JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS
MODERN AMERICA (1977).

AND

SOCIAL CHANGE

IN

11. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1979).
12. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American
Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 320 (1985).

2021]

SCHLEGELIANS V. LANGDELLIANS

91

then control the market for purveyors of that content.13 Like
other academic professions (studied by the intellectual
historian Dorothy Ross)14:
[A] small group of scholars created an academic discipline where
none had been before. Each group began by staking out part of the
intellectual world as its “turf,” adopting a particular way of looking
at that turf, a method as it were, and moving to cut out the
“amateurs” who formerly had a claim to that turf.15

In Langdell’s case, the move was to identify the turf as “pure
law,” the rules of private law doctrine to be found in appellate
cases.16 Doctrinal analysis and argument is the thing we do
that nobody else does. “Law = rules” as Schlegel sees it, is the
gist of Langdell’s bequest, the “empty envelope” he left for
future generations.
The clearest illustration of the depth of the cultural equation of law
with rule is the reaction of individuals fresh from our culture; take
any group of middle class, first-year law students and try any
approach other than a doctrinal, rule-focused one. They hate the
alternatives because the alternatives undercut the notion of law as
specialized knowledge available only to, and for sale by, the
professional lawyer. That is the identity that they bring with them
to law school, for that is what the culture tells them law is about.
Legal education supports the notion of law as rule in the classroom
and in the journals, in our bones as it were, just as it supports the
notion that the prevailing rules are on the whole justified, a
comforting notion for the bar as well as for the neophytes whom we
train.17

I recall learning the truth of this in a painful way when, as a
still novice teacher I was invited to teach a large first-year
class in Contracts at Harvard Law School. As a colleague, at
the time, of Stewart Macaulay’s at Wisconsin, and imbued
with the gospel of studying law in society, I began my course

13. Id. at 319–20.
14. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1990).
15. Schlegel, supra note 12, at 314.
16. Id. at 323.
17. John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy Or, the Case of the Empty
Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (1984).
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(as my own teacher Lon Fuller had done) with remedies, and
led the students to see that the expectation measure of
damages, reduced by mitigation, foreseeability, causation,
and uncertainty limitations, and the unavailability of
damages for non-economic harm or punitive sanctions unless
one could prove an independent tort, all coupled with the
American rule requiring parties to pay their own attorney’s
fees, meant that most breaches of contract were simply not
worth suing on. A substantial fraction of the class informed
me that all this was not Law but rather Sociology of Law,
which they had not come to Law School to learn. A real
lawyer, on this view, would instruct his or her clients in the
nuances of contract doctrine, without tactlessly and
irrelevantly informing them they had no chance of recovering
any money. I would bet that almost every law teacher has
had an experience like this.18 More systematically, Elizabeth
Mertz’s fascinating study of Contracts classes at eight
different US law schools observes that law teachers keep any
kind of non-doctrinal—e.g., social-contextual or explicitly
policy-based or moral—matter safely at the margin, open to
brief and casual impressionistic discussions rather than the
subject of rigorous analysis.19 David Sandomierski of the
University of Western Ontario Law School has just published
a massive study of Canadian Contracts teachers.20 He shows
that most of them (largely under the influence of graduate
training in US law schools) have absorbed and internalized
the basic insights of legal realism—that law is a product of
its social context, that it reflects plural and often
contradictory purposes and is riven by latent ideological
conflict, and that communicating these insights is

18. It would be remiss of me not to add that I came to love this class, which
remains one of the happiest teaching experiences of my career.
19. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE
LIKE A LAWYER” 211–12 (2007).

OF

LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING

TO

“THINK

20. DAVID SANDOMIERSKI, ASPIRATION AND REALITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 178–
80 (2020).
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indispensable to the practical training of future lawyers.21
But, his book concludes, most of them do very little to
operationalize these insights in their teaching, which is
overwhelmingly, like that in the American classes reported
by Mertz, doctrinal.22 Orthodoxy in perceptions of what is
“practical” education seems to be silently enforced by
students, as well as by general expectations of the
profession—notwithstanding
the
nearly
universal
experience of graduates, once out of school, that their law
school actually did very little to prepare them for practice.
To sum up: Langdell’s legacy is impoverished because it
gives a false idea of law. For Schlegel the legal realist, law is
not a body of rules, but an array of practices. “It is
institutions, actors of many kinds, and groups, a whole social
manifold, and it is not just ideology, but actual resolution of
conflicts, drama, and getting from yesterday to tomorrow in
the bureaucratic state, as well.”23 The legacy is impoverished
because the study of law as rules cuts them off from their
social context, their political origins and consequences, their
actual functioning. And in addition to not being sufficiently
theoretical, or sufficiently grounded in history, social theory,
and economic context, the study of law-as-rules is not very
practical either. Analysis and argument over legal doctrine
is one set of lawyers’ practical tasks, but only one and far
from the most frequent. Compare, for example: investigating
and arguing about facts; tweaking forms to fit particular
transactional purposes; devising a legal structure around a
business plan; case selection for strategic reasons; managing
multi-party negotiations toward a commonly accepted
outcome; engaging in regulatory arbitrage; trying to get a
client into a drug rehab program to keep him out of prison;
valuing a torts case; and steering a greedy or angry client

21. Id. at 286–90.
22. Id.
23. John Henry Schlegel, An Irrelevancy, Perhaps, 6 L. & POL’Y 307, 308
(1984).
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toward a realistic settlement, among a million others. If he
had his way, clearly, Schlegel would aim for a curriculum
somewhat closer to the Pomeroy model—a grounding in
theory and history, followed by a series of exercises in
practical tasks.
To recapitulate: If law was to be a profession, it had to be
attached to a university; if attached to a university, it had to
have plausible academic content. The content Harvard chose
to settle on was “pure law,” that is, private-law “science” in
the arid mode of Austin’s jurisprudence, the exercise of
grouping legal doctrines into categories of principles, and
showing how they could be derived from those principles. The
dominant alternative in Anglo-American tradition was a
view of law that, instead of setting it apart from all the other
social sciences in its own narrow realm, established it as the
Queen of Social Sciences, integrating history, political
economy, and moral theory into the ultimate purpose and
end product toward which the scientific study of the social
world was directed, the Science of Legislation. This was the
science prefigured in Adam Smith’s Lectures on
Jurisprudence and Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral
Sentiments, taken up in Bentham’s codification projects and
J.S. Mill’s tracts on Political Economy, and (not always with
happy results!) applied to India through the codes of
Macaulay, James Mill, and Fitzjames Stephen.24 Similarly,
draft model legislation was announced to be the ultimate byproduct of studies conducted under the auspices of the
American Social Science Association, the umbrella
association for the new social sciences founded in 1865.25
If these were the principal alternatives, you can see why
the new universities springing up in the West and out of the
land-grant colleges would pick the Langdell model. The
Science of Legislation was political dynamite: heterodox

24. See ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA (1989).
25. On the ASSA, see THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1977).
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professors like Henry Carter Adams, Edward Bemis, E.A.
Ross, and Thorstein Veblen were fired at the instance of
conservative trustees, and the president of the new American
Economic Association, Richard T. Ely, nearly lost his job as
well.26 (Harvard’s trustees actually did try to fire some Law
School professors for their political opinions in the 1920s—
Zechariah Chafee for criticizing Red Scare prosecutions,
Felix Frankfurter for questioning the fairness of Sacco and
Vanzetti’s trial.)27 The strictly private-law focus of Harvard
was much less obviously political. Moreover, Harvard
seemed to show that a law school could admit and teach
hundreds of students at a time, could rake in tuition money
for the central university rather than depending on its
subsidies, could attract young faculty out of practice without
paying them all that much, and still enjoy great prestige.28
Once the West Publishing Company saw money in
publishing casebooks (an important part of the story Schlegel
tells),29 Harvard’s case method of teaching was easily
transplanted to new venues. Bright young lawyers could be
recruited out of practice, could keep a few cases ahead of the
students in the class while interrogating them mockSocratically, engaging them as equals before the same
texts—and (also thanks to West) do research for their own
26. See MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–1905 (1975).

IN THE

27. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL & DANIEL COQUILLETTE, THE INTELLECTUAL SWORD:
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, THE SECOND CENTURY 132–48 (2020).
28. A new book just off the presses on the history of Harvard Law School in
the 20th century shows that the School’s financial model became the template,
not just for other law schools, but for graduate professional education in the US
generally. Id. at 195–218. Big differences opened up between the schools’
financial fortunes because law schools were at a relative disadvantage (until late
in the 20th century) to raise significant amounts of money from sources other
than tuitions. Id. at 787. Medical schools benefited from huge philanthropic
benefactors, business schools from wealthy business donors. Lawyers were
thought neither to need charity nor to be worthy objects of philanthropy. Harvard
Law School itself was unable to raise any outside money until the Erwin Griswold
era (1946-68), and only really succeeded at fundraising beginning with the
deanship of Robert Clark (1989-2003). Id. at 800–02.
29. See Schlegel, supra note 12, at 318.

96

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

articles, casebooks and treatises without leaving the library.
Teaching the Science of Legislation, on the other hand, would
have required a faculty of polymaths like Pomeroy or
Wigmore and probably needed miracles to engage the
students.
Now although change has been very slow and halting, I
actually think there has been some movement in recent
years away from the Langdellian model and somewhat more
nearly approaching the Schlegelian in legal education. The
improvement has mostly come on the academic side of
contextual studies of law, rather than on the practicaltraining side (though there is some movement in that
direction too). The ideological content of law, formerly
concealed under a screen of superficial “policy argument” and
“interest balancing,” is now out in the open.30 Empirical
studies in law-and-society and law-and-economics of the kind
that Schlegel’s Realists tried out and mostly failed to follow
through on, is also much more common and no longer such a
despised and neglected poor relation in the law school
faculties. Although it may once have been true that “law and”
scholarship drawing on other disciplines imported only
schlock versions of the other discipline, it is no longer true in
every field, and certainly not in the field Schlegel and I both
inhabit of legal history, where scholars appointed to law
school faculties have won more than their share of history
prizes in recent years.31
Yet the expansion of interdisciplinary academic
connections has provoked the inevitable backlash. Law
30. For this unmasking, credit is due to Chicago 1970s-style Law and
Economics, which pretended to be a neutral positive science but was plainly
anything but; to Critical Legal Studies and Feminist and Critical Race Theory;
and not least to the Federalist Society, Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and Mitch
McConnell among others who have not even tried to pretend that adjudication is
a politically neutral enterprise.
31. The Bancroft Prize for the best book in American history has been
awarded to legal scholars in 2016 (Mary Bilder), 2013 (John Fabian Witt), 2012
(Tomiko Brown Nagin), 2011 (Christopher Tomlins), 2005 (Michael Klarman),
and 1978 (Morton Horwitz).
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offices want the schools to produce more “practice-ready”
graduates to save them the cost of on-the-job training; and
bar associations hope to make legal education more practical
(sometimes by requiring more training in trial practice—
trial practice, mind you, in the age of the vanishing trial!)
and, more usefully, to partner with practitioners to teach
something about document drafting and transactional
practice.
Even more threatening: the appalling cost of seven years
of higher education as a prerequisite to admission to the
profession, now imposing student debt loads of half a million
dollars or more, while even public law schools’ budgets are
no longer subsidized, raises doubts about whether either the
Langdellian model or the more academically and practically
valuable—but also more labor-intensive—Schlegelian model
can be sustained. All these problems will be made worse by
the looming recession of the plague years.
And as we all know, as the academic side of law teaching
has swollen, so has our distance from the profession and the
interests of most of our students, not always all that close to
begin with. Schlegel has a lot to say about the
phenomenology of the law teacher and of the students he or
she tries to teach, and his meditations on their alienated
condition are the most brilliant and penetrating I have seen
anywhere.
Schlegel isn’t just a grumpy old man complaining about
“the youth of today” and their hippity-hop music and
annoying habit of treading on his lawn. He understands and
sympathizes with their alienation, up to a point. He knows
the reasons for it are the insecurity of employment in the
legal market and the terrible burden of debt and the fear that
taking risks might mess up one’s resume or GPA.
They did not create the world in which they find themselves and it
is highly doubtful that they would have chosen it had they been
given a choice. It is ugly to find oneself in a world where social
advance, or even maintenance of social position, requires twenty
years of an education that is not intrinsically attractive leading to
not very secure employment opportunities doing work that is not all
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that interesting.32

But he is grieved to observe the deadly effects of such
conditions on the will to learn.
[A]t times, it seems that almost everything other than the thinnest,
narrowest, most quickly comprehended material, delivered much as
the classic heroin addict’s plea, “straight in the arm,” is an
imposition on the life of the law student, a life conceived as moving
on, getting this over with, as an endless series of occasions to hit the
“page down” button on the computer program that is learning.
Maybe even on the computer program that is life.33

Thus the demand for the doctrinal curriculum, for law as
rules. To give Langdell credit, what he promoted, and
apparently himself brought to the classroom, was lively
disputation about rules.34 What many students prefer,
however, is simple exposition of the rules, in the manner of
the well-taught bar review cram course. This is perfectly
good instruction for the purpose of passing the bar exam. But
it has little or no value as preparation for the practice of
law—for what Schlegel calls “keeping the job,” rather than
“getting the job.” Good lawyering—unfortunately less and
less common in an age where much practice is bureaucratic
routine—is a craft skill, and one that calls for the exercise of
judgment.
The subject of judgment can be various: a merger, a regulatory
filing, a financing package, a property settlement, a plea
agreement, a complaint, a brief, a trial strategy, the structure of a
financial instrument, or a business plan. All require judgment, a
matter of more or less, a matter of taking ownership of a problem
and so accepting responsibility for the quality of the solution
proffered, rather than merely deferring to “the law.” More crudely
put, it is the act of putting one’s butt on the line. A lawyer who

32. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 469 (2018).
33. Id. at 443.
34. Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions,
Which They Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in
the Classrooms of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 57
(1999). Schlegel comments on this article in Langdell’s Auto-da-Fe, 17 L. & HIST.
REV. 149 (1999).
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exercises judgment accepts the risk that the advice given will be
less than optimum, even wrong, and so accepts the blame that
follows from poor judgment. Thus, for the exercise of judgment—as
distinguished from “just” filing routine papers—a lawyer is entitled
to be paid well, even when no question of malpractice could possibly
arise.35

If anyone has said this better, I don’t know who it is.
How does Schlegel himself handle the challenge of
teaching in an alienated and bureaucratic age? The model he
offers is not one he expects anyone else to follow. Its
exemplar is Don Fabrizio Corbèra, the eponymous
aristocratic hero of Lampedusa’s Leopard, in his own eyes a
walking anachronism.
I teach as if law were a species of handicraft, and for those who
might possibly so understand it. The trick then—Don Fabrizio’s
trick—is at the same time to harbor no illusions about what is being
learned, as well as no regrets that other things are not being
learned. Teach for the handcrafters, those who are willing, however
hesitantly, to take the risk of exercising judgment, but grade for the
credentialists, since the handcrafters will need the credential too.36

I would bet that more students than Schlegel gives himself
credit for, who have been exposed to his steadfast cranky
integrity, have recognized that they have brushed against
greatness.

35. Schlegel, supra note 32, at 463–64.
36. Id. at 477–78.

